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In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identi-
fied a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success.
However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings con-
cerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores
two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature.
First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an
important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both threats and
imposed sanctions. Second, to lessen model dependency of empir-
ical findings, we employ a methodology that permits us to check
systematically the robustness of the empirical results under var-
ious model specifications. Using the newly released Threat and
Imposition of Economic Sanctions data, our analyses of both
threats and imposed sanctions show that two factors—involvement
of international institutions and severe costs on target states—are
positively and robustly related to sanctions success at every stage
in sanctions episodes. Our analyses also identify a number of other
variables that are systematically related to sanctions success, but
the significance of these relationships depends on the specific model
estimated. Finally, our results point to a number of differences at
the threat and imposition stages, which suggests specific selection
effects that should be explored in future work.
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The conventional wisdom of 20 years ago held that economic sanctions
are not effective policy instruments. Recent research has convinced many
scholars that sanctions can influence targets’ behavior under identifiable
conditions, however. Some have argued that the key variable in sanctions
success is whether the costs to the target are sufficiently high (Doxey 1980;
Drury 1998; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990; Morgan and Schwebach 1997)
while others have suggested that sanctions will work if they are “smart,” that
is, if sanctions are designed so that the costs are borne by the right peo-
ple in the target state (Cortright and Lopez 2002; Morgan and Schwebach
1996). Drezner (1999) has argued that a key variable in determining sanc-
tions outcomes is the extent to which the sender and target expect to be
involved in future conflicts. Others have focused on the characteristics of
states involved in sanctions episodes and have suggested, for example, that
democratic targets or states that are suffering internal turmoil are partic-
ularly susceptible to sanctions (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Brooks 2002;
Lektzian and Souva 2007). Still others have suggested that the key variable
is whether they are imposed unilaterally or by a multilateral coalition (Bapat
and Morgan 2009; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999; Martin 1993; Miers and
Morgan 2002).
While the literature has identified many factors as possible determinants
of sanctions success, the empirical findings regarding these hypotheses have
been inconclusive.1 For example, Drezner (1999) and Allen (2005, 2008) find
that sanctions against allies are more likely to succeed, but Drury (1998) and
Krustev and Morgan (2011) find no support for this claim, and Nooruddin
(2002) and Early (2011) find that sanctions against allies are less likely to suc-
ceed for US sanctions. Even when we consider the cost of sanctions, which
many see as the most important predictor of sanctions success, the empirical
findings are not conclusive (Bonetti 1998; Jing, Kaempfer, and Lowenberg
2003; Nooruddin 2002).
Among the possible reasons that might account for this lack of agree-
ment in the empirical literature of sanctions effectiveness, two stand out.
First, most findings reported in any one article result from one regression
model (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007). Even though many scholars con-
duct tests to ensure the robustness of their findings, these attempts are often
1Some empirical findings on the determinants of sanctions success are summarized in Table 1. The table is
not meant to be comprehensive; rather, it illustrates the large range of variation in the previous empirical
findings.
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not sufficient—they simply include a few more variables to see if the main
results hold. The problem with such robustness checks is that they leave
open the possibility that the results could change with still different variables
or model specifications.
Second, many recent theories suggest that threats are an important part
of sanctions episodes (Drezner 2003; Eaton and Engers 1992; Krustev 2010;
Lacy and Niou 2004; Morgan and Miers 1999; Smith 1996). They suggest
that sanctions policies might actually be more effective than the previ-
ous studies suggest, but to observe this, we also have to consider cases
in which sanctions were threatened, but not imposed. It might be that in
those cases where sanctions would induce targets to alter their behavior,
targets can anticipate this when sanctions are threatened and change their
policies before sanctions actually occur. Additionally, when evaluating the
determinants of the success of sanctions, this argument suggests that it might
be problematic to look only at actually imposed sanctions. For instance, if
sanctions imposed through international institutions are more likely to suc-
ceed because they can generate higher costs, target states facing threats from
international institutions may already take this information into account and
concede at the threat stage. As a result, the cases where imposed sanc-
tions are observed consist mainly of instances in which targets did not relent
even though they were facing the prospects of the high costs of sanc-
tions by the international institutions. If we only analyze this nonrandom
sample of cases, we would falsely conclude there to be a weak, perhaps
insignificant, relationship between institutional involvement and sanctions
success. The crux of this argument is that the selection process may be
preventing us from appropriately evaluating the determinants of sanctions
success.
In this research note, we explore these two shortcomings in the existing
empirical literature to examine the robustness of the relationships between
sanctions success and a number of variables that may contribute to success.
First, using a newly released Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions
(TIES) dataset (Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2009), we include threat cases
in our analyses together with cases of imposed sanctions. This allows us
to investigate which factors affect the likelihood that the sender achieves its
goals through threats and impositions of sanctions. We also conduct separate
analyses on the threat and imposition stages. Comparison of these results
allows us to see how the effects of various factors may change at different
stages in sanctions episodes.
Second, we employ an approach that permits us to check systematically
the robustness of our findings (Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Leamer 1985;
Sala-i-Martin 1997; Sturm, Berger, and De Haan 2005). In particular, we use
a set of 18 factors that the literature identified as determinants of sanctions
success and run every regression possible with the combination of these
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Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness 85
variables.2 We then combine results from these regressions to establish the
distribution of parameter estimates, which informs us about the robustness
of these relationships.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We take all of our sanctions data from the new TIES data set (Morgan et al.
2009).3 TIES contains data on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened
and/or imposed in the 1971–2000 period. Sanctions are defined as actions
that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with
a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change its policies.
By definition, a sanction must (1) involve one or more sender states and a
target state, and (2) be implemented by the sender in order to change the
behavior of the target state. Actions taken by states that restrict economic
relations with other countries for solely domestic economic policy reasons
therefore do not qualify as sanctions. For the purposes of this dataset, all
sanctions cases may only include one target state. If a sender state makes
threats against multiple targets, a new case is created for each individual
target.4
While we are interested in which variables increase the probability that
the sender achieves its policy goal, we are also interested in which factors
affect the success rate at different stages in sanctions episodes. We therefore
conduct three sets of analyses: (1) one that investigates the success of both
threats and imposed sanctions, (2) one that examines the success of imposed
sanctions, and (3) one that considers the success of sanctions threats.5
The analysis of both threats and imposed sanctions includes 842 cases.6
For this analysis, a sanction case is coded a success if the target partially
or completely acquiesced, or the case ended with negotiated settlement.7
2For the sake of space, we do not provide a detailed summary of existing theoretical arguments on
the effects of these eighteen factors on sanctions success. However, we provide a table (see Table 1)
listing these 18 theoretical concepts found in the literature as well as expected relationships between
these factors and sanctions success. Table 1 also provides representative findings from studies that were
intended to test these relationships. In the last two columns, we introduce variables that our analyses use
to test the effects of these 18 theoretical concepts, and their measurements.
3The TIES data set can be obtained at http://www.unc.edu/~bapat/TIES.htm.
4Sanctions may take many forms including actions such as tariffs, export controls, embargoes, import
bans, travel bans, asset freezes, aid cuts, and blockades.
5In keeping with the definition of the TIES data, we view a “sanction” as a policy tool by a sender(s).
Therefore, we do not model the selection process between threats and impositions, but look at the
separate phases of the sanctioning case. This leaves the focus on whether, once the policy begins, the
sanction works. Modeling the entire process is beyond the scope of this research note.
6We exclude cases in which the target is an international organization or an entity that the Correlates of
War project does not recognize as a state (for example, Macao and Hong-Kong).
7Of the possible indicators suggested by Morgan et al. (2009), this is the one that strikes the best balance
of the reliability and captures what most people seem to think what constitutes success. Alternatively,
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For the analysis of successes of imposed sanctions, we consider 510 cases
where sanctions were imposed.8 An imposed sanction is coded a success
if the case ended with target’s complete or partial acquiescence, or negoti-
ated settlement. For the analysis of threat successes, we examine 664 cases
where threats were made before sanctions were imposed. We code a threat
successful if the case ended with target’s complete or partial acquiescence
or negotiated settlement before sanctions were imposed.9 Note that cases
where sanctions are imposed are coded unsuccessful for the analysis of threat
success.
For all sets of analyses, we use the same 18 independent variables,
which are summarized in the “Measurement (Data Source)” column of
Table 1. Note that in this research note we only consider the uncondi-
tional effects of these independent variables simply because most existing
arguments are about them.
Sensitivity Analysis
A key problem in any regression is that we may find that a certain variable
has a large and statistically significant association in one model, but is less
relevant when other covariates are included or dropped. This occurs because
we never know the “true” data generating process (Sala-i-Martin 1997).
Simply adding more controls does not guarantee that this bias decreases
(Clarke 2005, 2009). Further, as all theoretical models are, inevitably, sim-
plifications of reality, no model can address all relevant variables. We are
therefore left with the question: how can we assure that the obtained
coefficients are not just a function of a particular selection of covariates?
To address this question, we take a systematic approach that is similar
to Leamer’s (1985) extreme bounds analysis.10 Using the 18 independent
variables, we run Bernoulli-logistic regressions with every combination of
these variables as predictors.11 This results in 262,143 (= 218 − 1) models with
we could define “success” more restrictively by considering a case successful only when it concluded
with a partial or total target concession. Another possibility is to use two indicators included in TIES that
represent the extent to which sender and target accomplished their objectives. We could code a case as
successful if the sender accomplished more of its policy objectives than does the target. We conducted
robustness checks using the more restrictive measure of success and find that our main findings hold.
The results are included in the web appendix.
8The analysis of imposed sanctions includes 178 cases where threats were not made before sanctions
impositions. These cases were excluded from the analysis of threat successes.
9All three dependent variables are binary.
10Hegre and Sambanis (2006), Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Sturm et al. (2005) use a variant of Leamer’s (1985)
extreme bounds analysis in their articles.
11All continuous variables were mean-centered and scaled by the standard deviation of the variable for
ease of interpretation (Gelman and Hill 2006).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [F
on
dr
en
 L
ibr
ary
, R
ice
 U
niv
ers
ity
 ] 
at 
14
:16
 20
 M
arc
h 2
01
3 
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness 87
each variable being included in 131,072 of them. We report the distributions
of the parameter estimates and t statistics for each independent variable.12
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Before we delve into a discussion of our empirical findings, let us briefly
explain how to interpret the results from our sensitivity analysis. Figure 1
reports the results for when we analyze both threatened and imposed
sanctions.13 The left column shows the distribution of the estimated coeffi-
cients; the right column gives the corresponding distribution of the absolute
values of the t statistics.14 For ease of interpretability, we consider variables
with t statistics above an absolute value of 1.65 to statistically significant.15
The vertical line in the right column represents a value of 1.65.
To make sense of the results in Figure 1, let us first examine the Target
Costs variable toward the bottom of the figure. All estimated coefficients fall
to the right of 0 which indicates that target costs are positively associated with
sanctions success in every model specification, regardless of which variables
are included. To the right, we see that all t statistics associated with Target
Costs are beyond 1.65 in their absolute value. This suggests that target costs
came out statistically significant in every regression in which it was included,
regardless of which other variables were included. From these results, we
can conclude that the target costs make sanctions success more likely and
do so robustly.
Second, consider the Target Trade Dependence variable. Most of its
estimated coefficients fall to the right of zero, indicating that we are cer-
tain about its positive relationship with sanctions success. Looking to the
t statistics, about a half of them fall to the left of 1.65, meaning that in
about a half of the regressions we ran, this relationship lacks statistical sig-
nificance. Consequently, it is possible that some particular analysis would
suggest that there is no significant relationship between target’s trade depen-
dence and sanctions success. Yet, our results suggest that the effect of
12To lessen the problems associated with missing data, we make use of multiple imputation (see King,
Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve 2001). We generate six complete data sets using Amelia II (Honaker
and King 2010), which fills in the missing values from the imputation posterior. We run each of the
262,143 models on the six imputed data sets, which results in the total of 1,572,858 models with
786,432 parameter estimates for each variable. These parameter estimates resulting are pooled for our
inference. Due to the massive memory requirements, we randomly draw 10% of the saved estimates.
We repeated this procedure several times to ensure that the graph we depict is not due to an odd draw.
13We generate figures using the ggplot2 package in R (Wickham 2009).
14We do not report the mean (weighted) coefficients and t statistics that Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Hegre
and Sambanis (2006) calculated in their papers. Instead, we focus our discussions on the distributions of
the results for each independent variable. As the graphs show, the means of the coefficients do not show
the great amount of heterogeneity of estimates across models. We believe that the distributions provide a
better representation of the effect and its robustness for the impacts of each of the variables.
15This corresponds to p < .10 in a two-tailed test.
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Coefficients t Statistics (Absolute)
Ally
Capability
Ratio
Carrots
Democratic
Sender
Democratic
Target
Export
Restrictions
Financial
Sanctions
High Issue
Saliency
IO Involvement
Multiple
Issues
Multiple
Senders
Rivalry
Sender Costs
Smart
Sanctions
Target Costs
Target
Instability
Target Trade
Dependence
United States
Sender
0 1 2 0 2 4 6 8
FIGURE 1 Analysis of all cases. The left column shows the distribution of the estimated
coefficients and the right column gives the distribution of the absolute values of the t statistics
for each variable. The vertical lines in both columns correspond to 0 and 1.65, respectively.
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Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness 89
target’s trade dependence is positive and that the relationship is weakly
robust.
Finally, consider the Sender Costs variable for which the coefficients
are split about evenly on each side of zero. This indicates that the signs of
the coefficient estimates depend essentially on which variables are included
in the models. Therefore, we cannot be certain whether the relationship
between sender costs and sanctions success is positive or negative. Moreover,
while most of the t statistics for the variable lie between 0 and 1.65, some do
exceed this value. This suggests that, under certain model specifications, it
is possible to find results indicating significant effects of sender costs; how-
ever, our sensitivity analysis suggests these are artifacts of particular models
and we conclude that sender costs appear to have no systematic effect on
sanctions success.
Success of Economic Sanctions
Having examined Target Costs, Sender Costs, and Target Trade Dependence
in all sanctions cases, let us examine the rest of the variables. Figure 1 reveals
that senders are more likely to achieve their goals (1) when they threaten
and/or impose sanctions under the auspices of international institutions (IO
Involvement) and (2) when sanctions are anticipated to impose or actually
impose severe economic costs on targets (Target Costs). In our analysis, these
factors are found to be positively associated with success of sanction poli-
cies, which is consistent with the hypotheses in the literature, and these
relationships are robust.
Figure 1 also suggests that many other variables may be systemati-
cally related to sanctions success, but their significance depends on which
other covariates are included. The relationships between sanctions success
and seven variables—Carrots, Democratic Sender, Democratic Target, Export
Restrictions, High Issue Saliency, Multiple Issues, Target Trade Dependence—
are found to be weakly robust, meaning that about half of the corresponding
t statistics are below 1.65. However, we find all or most of the coefficient
estimates for these variables are in the same direction. We believe this sug-
gests that we can be certain that these seven variables do have a systematic
effect on sanctions success even though the statistical significance of the
results depends on the particular model specification.
Finally, our results show that the rest of the variables appear to have no
systematic effect on sanctions success. Their t statistics fall below 1.65 and
the directions of the coefficients are lacking a systematic pattern. This result
suggests that these variables do not look to be relevant to sanctions success.
Note that it is still possible to find model specifications in which they have a
statistically significant relationship with sanctions success. Our results show
that these relationships are not to be taken as robust, however.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [F
on
dr
en
 L
ibr
ary
, R
ice
 U
niv
ers
ity
 ] 
at 
14
:16
 20
 M
arc
h 2
01
3 
90 N. A. Bapat et al.
Analysis of Imposed Sanctions
Figure 2 shows the results when we analyze only cases of imposed sanctions.
In this analysis, we are interested in which factors contribute to success of
sanctions once sanctions are imposed. Thus, we exclude cases where sanc-
tions were not imposed (that is, cases where threats succeeded or senders
chose not to follow through their threats). We notice from Figure 2 that, in
contrast to the results in Figure 1, there are considerably fewer systematic pat-
terns. We find that, as was the case in Figure 1, the effects of IO Involvement
and Target Costs are robust and positive. Aside from these two variables,
there are only three variables—Financial Sanctions, Multiple Issues, Target
Trade Dependence—that appear to be systematically (and positively) related
to success of imposed sanctions. However, these variables are only weakly
robust.
The findings in Figure 2 map neatly with those from previous studies,
which mostly looked at imposed sanctions. Our results are thus commensu-
rate with the varied findings that we reported in Table 1 in that for every
relationship, there exists at least one study in which the coefficient was
shown to be insignificant. Along similar lines, Table 1 also shows that some
variables were found both positively and negatively related to success. Our
results corroborate this as the relationships between most variables and suc-
cess of imposed sanctions are sensitive to changes in model specifications.
For example, some studies found the effects of the Ally and Sender Cost vari-
ables to be positive while others reported negative effects. Our findings in
Figure 2 show that the possibilities for positive and negative relations exist.
Our results suggest that if one considers only imposed sanctions, one’s con-
clusions will be heavily dependent on the specific model estimated. To be
somewhat circumspect, we have to recognize that one of the models we
run might be the “true” specification and that might be appropriate tests
of specific theoretical hypotheses. These sensitivity analyses might also sug-
gest, however, that understanding sanctions effectiveness requires that we
consider both threats and impositions.
Analysis of Sanctions Threats
We now turn to the results in Figure 3 when we consider only threat cases.
Here we are interested in identifying which factors influence the probability
that threats of sanctions are effective. Thus, the dependent variable is the
threat success, and we consider it a failure if sanctions are imposed or if
the sender capitulates before imposing sanctions. In Figure 3, we see that
threats are more likely to succeed if (1) they are issued under the auspices
of international institutions (IO Involvement), (2) severe economic costs on
the targets are anticipated (Target Costs), and (3) disputed issues are salient
(High Issue Saliency). The effects of these variables are robust.
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Coefficients t Statistics (Absolute)
Ally
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Sender
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Sanctions
High Issue
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Issues
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Senders
Rivalry
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Sanctions
Target
Costs
Target
Instability
Target Trade
Dependence
United States
Sender
−1 0 1 2 3 4 0 2 4 6 8
FIGURE 2 Analysis of imposed sanctions. The left column shows the distribution of the
estimated coefficients and the right column gives the distribution of the absolute values of
the t statistics for each variable. The vertical lines in both columns correspond to 0 and 1.65,
respectively.
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Coefficients t Statistics (Absolute)
Ally
Capability
Ratio
Carrots
Democratic
Sender
Democratic
Target
Export
Restrictions
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Sanctions
High Issue
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IO Involvement
Multiple
Issues
Multiple
Senders
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Sender
Costs
Smart
Sanctions
Target
Costs
Target
Instability
Target Trade
Dependence
United States
Sender
−2 −1 0 1 2 0 2 4 6 8
FIGURE 3 Analysis of sanctions threat. The left column shows the distribution of the esti-
mated coefficients and the right column gives the distribution of the absolute values of the
t statistics for each variable. The vertical lines in both columns correspond to 0 and 1.65,
respectively.
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Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness 93
Figure 3 also suggests that six variables are systematically related
to threat success, but not robustly so. These variables include Carrots,
Democratic Target, Export Restrictions, Financial Sanctions, Multiple Issues,
and United States Sender. About half of their respective t statistics fall below
1.65 for each of these variables, but the estimated coefficients are consis-
tently in the same direction. Thus, we are certain about the direction of the
effects of Carrots and United States Sender (positive) and that of the effects
of Democratic Target, Export Restrictions, Financial Sanctions, and Multiple
Issues (negative).
It is worth pointing out several differences between the results from
analysis of threat successes and that of success of imposed sanctions. We first
discuss one factor that seems to be systematically related to success at the
imposition stage but not at the threat stage. Our results suggest that the
Target Trade Dependence variable is positively and fairly robustly correlated
with success when we analyze only imposed sanctions. However, when we
consider success of threats, the relationship becomes ambiguous. Thus, our
results suggest an interesting puzzle: Why does a target’s trade dependence
seem to be associated with success at the imposition stage but not at the
threat stage?
In contrast, some factors are found to be relevant at the threat stage,
but are either not related or related in the opposite directions at the impo-
sition stage. Some variables, including Carrots, Democratic Target, Export
Restrictions, High Issue Saliency, and United States Sender are found to have
ambiguous relationships with success when only imposed sanctions are ana-
lyzed, but the relationships become clearer and more robust when threat
success is analyzed. Additionally, a few variables like Financial Sanctions
and Multiple Issues are found to be positively related to success at the impo-
sition stage, but negatively associated with success at the threat stage. The
implications of these findings for theories of sanctions may be significant.
One reason that accounts for these results may be a selection effect. For
example, our finding that carrots contribute to threat success is entirely con-
sistent with the expectation in the literature. But, precisely because carrots
help induce targets to give in before the sanctions are imposed, cases where
the sender imposed sanctions but offered carrots before imposition of sanc-
tions can be considered hard cases. That is, the carrots offered before the
imposition were not valuable enough to convince the target to give in. If this
argument is true, the relationship between carrots and sanctions success
should be negative for these hard cases. This mechanism may have con-
taminated the positive effect of carrots on sanctions success. We believe this
implies that future theoretical work must explicitly consider possible selec-
tion mechanisms and address why these factors but not others may matter at
different stages in sanctions episodes.
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CONCLUSION
Using the newly released TIES data set and an approach similar to the one
suggested by Leamer (1985), we report the robustness of the relationships
between sanctions success and factors that are identified to contribute to suc-
cess in the literature. We find many relationships to be sensitive to changes
in variables included in the model, but others are not. We find that two
factors—the target costs and international institutions—are robust determi-
nants of success. Our analyses also suggest that the senders are more likely
to achieve their goals when carrots are offered by the senders; when the
senders are democratic; when the targets are not democratic; when sanc-
tions do not include export restrictions; when issues are less salient; when
multiple issues are involved; and when the target highly depends on the
trade with the sender.
We further investigated which factors determine success at different
stages in sanctions episodes. We find that the target costs and international
institutions are robust determinants of both threats and imposed sanctions
and also that the issue saliency is robustly related to success of threat.
Furthermore, comparison of results from these separate analyses provides
some interesting empirical findings. For example, we find that financial sanc-
tions are less likely to be effective at threat stage, but more likely to succeed
at the imposition stage. Our results also indicate that when multiple issues
are involved, threats are less likely to be successful, but imposed sanctions
are more likely to succeed.
This research note does not seek to test any particular theory of
sanctions success or sort out the different causal mechanisms behind the
correlations found in our analysis. Instead, we were motivated by the fact
that even though the sanctions literature to date has suggested a number of
factors as determinants of sanctions success, there is little agreement on their
empirical merits. This research note seeks to establish which correlations are
systematic and robust. However, we believe that our results will help sanc-
tions scholars with their theory-building. By establishing which factors have
robust effects on sanctions success, our results point to which variables need
to be included in future theories of sanctions effectiveness. Our analysis also
reveals empirical patterns that have not been theoretically well understood.
In particular, these findings provide some guidance regarding which selec-
tion processes may be at work in sanctions cases. At the very least, it is clear
that much of the “action” occurs at the threat stage.
As always the case with any empirical studies, our study is also limited
because certain sources of uncertainty are not considered here. For example,
we have not considered the uncertainty in the measurements of the vari-
ables or the choice of statistical models. We also have not considered certain
interactions of the factors, such as the interaction between multiple issues,
institution involvement, and multilateral sanctions that recent studies have
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suggested (Bapat and Morgan 2009). These sources of uncertainty should be
explored in future work.
Our results provide strong evidence for some of the relationships that
received mixed empirical findings in the previous studies. Our findings on
the target costs and international institutions confirm that the literature has
developed a good understanding of the factors that determine sanctions
success. Moreover, we find that many factors contribute to success at the
threat stage before sanctions are imposed. These findings are consistent with
recent theories that suggest threats are important part of sanction episodes.
In contrast, we also find that target’s trade dependence matters for success of
imposed sanctions, but not for threat success. Our results show that certain
factors contribute to success at different stages of sanctions episode, but our
theoretical understanding of why and how these patterns emerge is still lim-
ited. Our empirical evidence calls for further theoretical as well as empirical
investigations of the mechanisms by which these factors contribute to the
success.
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